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463 
DIVIDING CITIZENS UNITED: THE CASE V. 
THE CONTROVERSY 
Laurence H. Tribe* 
In the five years since Citizens United,1 that notorious and 
much-misunderstood2 Supreme Court decision has become more 
than just a case: it has become a symbol, a rallying cry. For some, 
it is an emblem of free speech values at their best. For others, it is 
a symptom of a deep sickness in our body politic. But we should 
not forget that it was a case first, with a plaintiff who wanted to 
distribute a political movie and was told “no.” 
As a case dealing with a particular controversy over a 
proposed publication, I believe Citizens United was rightly 
decided, for the reasons I discuss in Part I, even if it was resolved 
in a way that was symptomatic of judicial overreach all too 
common on the current Court. But as a symbol and a symptom, 
Citizens United has broader significance reflected in the Court’s 
eventual opinion. It represents a bizarrely cramped and naïve 
vision of political corruption and improper influence in the 
electoral process—one that has become characteristic of Roberts 
Court campaign finance law. And, more broadly, it is part of a 
trend in First Amendment law that is transforming that body of 
doctrine into a charter of largely untrammeled libertarianism, in 
which the regulation of virtually all forms of speech and all kinds 
of speakers is treated with the same heavy dose of judicial 
skepticism, with exceptions perversely calculated to expose 
particularly vulnerable and valuable sorts of expression to 
 
 * Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard University, and Professor of 
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. This essay’s origin lies in a symposium on the 
intersection of First Amendment law and corporate law held at Harvard Law School on 
November 7, 2014, and I am grateful to my friend and colleague John Coates for including 
me in that symposium. Thanks also to my students Sam Barr, Elizabeth Bewley, Jonathan 
Gould, Chris Havasy, Robert Niles, and Max Rosen for their excellent research assistance. 
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Blaming Citizens United alone for our campaign finance system is particularly 
mistaken. As Joshua Matz and I recently wrote, Buckley v. Valeo “caused a deluge long 
before Citizens United.” LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE 97 
(2014). And Super PACs trace their origin, at least most immediately, to the D.C. Circuit’s 
post-Citizens United decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC. See id. at 106. 
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unconvincingly justified suppression.3 It is those trends, rather 
than the outcome of Citizens United as applied to the facts before 
the Court, that need to be revisited. 
Part II provides a first cut at rethinking campaign finance 
law. This effort is informed by the recognition that there are few 
if any easy answers in this field. The First Amendment requires 
hard choices about seriously conflicting yet equally foundational 
constitutional values: democracy, liberty, equality. Each one of 
these values is contested; no single value or theory can or should 
reign supreme. But, as I strive to show, the Supreme Court has 
started to privilege—throughout First Amendment law—an 
overly skeptical and distrustful understanding of democracy and 
an excessively rigid and mechanical approach to liberty, leaving 
equality increasingly out of the picture.4 I believe the Court would 
do well to rethink that approach. 
I. CITIZENS UNITED AS A CASE 
The popular uproar over the outcome and aftermath of 
Citizens United has disguised the complexity of the issues 
presented in the case itself. Citizens United forced the Court to 
determine whether and how Congress can exclude disfavored 
speakers from the political marketplace altogether or severely 
restrict their participation in the name of political equality and 
electoral fairness. The strong language in Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion about the necessity of categorical First Amendment 
protections for political discourse and the danger to our 
democracy of letting government officials decide who may and 
may not participate in that discourse expresses legitimate 
 
 3. For examples of such exceptions, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 
U.S. 1 (2010) (speech implicating national security concerns); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393 (2007) (speech by public school students); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (speech 
involving prisoners); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (government employee 
speech). See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 127–39. 
 4. In an earlier era, the Court took more seriously how various ways of reading the 
First Amendment would differentially affect the wealthy and the economically 
disadvantaged. Writing for a majority of the Court in 1943, for example, Justice Black 
expressly took into account egalitarian concerns in writing that “[d]oor to door distribution 
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.” Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: 
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 599–606 (1985) (discussing 
Burger Court cases demonstrating “[t]he Court’s use of an approach that increasingly 
allows it to ignore the distributional dimension of legal rights,” id. at 603). For an account 
sympathetic to the idea that egalitarian norms should inform First Amendment analysis, 
see, for example, OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE 
MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996). 
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constitutional concerns that too often get minimized in the 
adverse reactions to Citizens United. 
The basic facts of Citizens United are worth revisiting 
because they are so often bypassed in the race to reach the more 
momentous issues. The case arose as a challenge to a federal law 
prohibiting “electioneering communications” backed by 
corporate funds in the thirty days before a primary election. The 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 prohibited 
corporations and unions from funding such “electioneering 
communications,” defined to include “‘any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days of a 
primary . . . election.”5 
The putative “electioneering communication” at issue in the 
case was a film, Hillary: The Movie, a highly critical 90-minute 
documentary about Hillary Clinton, who was then a candidate in 
the 2008 Democratic presidential primary. Citizens United, a 
nonprofit corporation partially funded by for-profit corporations, 
sought to promote Hillary: The Movie on TV and distribute it 
through video-on-demand. Citizens United, fearing possible civil 
and criminal penalties under the campaign finance law for 
promoting the film, sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the 
restriction on “electioneering communications” was 
unconstitutional as applied to its case. 
These facts alone should give campaign finance reformers 
pause. A nonprofit corporation motivated by its openly 
proclaimed conservative ideology wanted to distribute a political 
documentary to willing, paying viewers—and it was being told it 
could not do so because some of its money came from for-profit 
corporations. Had the political shoe been on the other foot, many 
of those crying “foul” might have had second thoughts. Yet the 
constitutional rule obviously cannot depend on whether the 
relevant litmus turns red or blue. In my view, the Court was 
correct in holding that the government could not bar such a film 
from airing—particularly at the very time when it would likely 
have the greatest impact, just before an election.6 But the Court 
did more than decide this as-applied challenge, instead reaching 
 
 5. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012)). 
 6. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating a state law making it a 
crime for a newspaper editor to publish an editorial on election day urging voters to vote 
a certain way). 
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out to invalidate the statute on its face. As detailed below, such 
Court-invited broadening of the issues initially presented by the 
parties has become a trait characteristic of the Roberts Court. 
A. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND SOME INADEQUATE 
RESPONSES 
When the Court first heard argument in Citizens United, it 
became clear that in order to uphold the law’s application to 
prevent Citizens United from distributing its film criticizing 
Hillary Clinton, the Court would also have to conclude that the 
very same organization could equally have been prevented from 
distributing a magazine or book with precisely the same content, 
at the same time, and with exactly the same financial backing. To 
be sure, efforts have been made to distinguish the print media 
from television on various (problematic) theories, focusing on 
spectrum scarcity or the ostensibly public ownership of the 
airwaves. But nobody supposes that books and films could 
plausibly be put into different First Amendment silos.7 Yet the 
nightmare image of bookburning—think Fahrenheit 4518—made 
the book hypothetical lethal to the attempt by the government’s 
attorney, Malcolm Stewart, to defend the Obama 
Administration’s effort to prevent what Citizens United sought to 
distribute. Justice Alito engineered a particularly devastating 
exchange in which the government lawyer seemingly had no 
choice but to concede that, under the Government’s theory, 
Congress could even ban books about candidates for political 
office if they were funded with corporate money.9 Chief Justice 
Roberts followed up: “It’s a 500-page book, and at the end it says, 
and so vote for X, the government could ban that?” The lawyer 
replied that it could.10 Though it took an additional round of oral 
argument and nearly a year for the Court to decide the case,11 
 
 7. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) 
(noting “the tension between the Supreme Court’s radically divergent approaches to the 
print and electronic media,” id. at 1005, and suggesting “a more candid equation between 
the new media and the old,” id. at 1010). 
 8. See generally RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953). 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–28, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 
08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
08-205.pdf. 
 10. Id. at 29. 
 11. In the second round of argument, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan was tasked 
with defending the law’s application to the anti-Hillary film as well as its facial validity. See 
Transcript of Oral Reargument at 29, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205%
5BReargued%5D.pdf. On reargument, Kagan noted that the FEC had never applied the 
relevant legal provision to books, id. at 65, and tried to distinguish books from pamphlets 
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Justice Kennedy in his opinion for the Court made clear that the 
problem identified in the initial argument was very much on the 
mind of the majority, presenting a parade of horribles that could 
be permitted if the Court rejected Citizens United’s facial 
challenge: 
The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days 
before the general election, that exhorts the public to 
disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national 
forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging 
the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent 
U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil 
Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for 
a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of 
free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of 
censorship.12 
In each of these examples, an ideologically motivated 
nonprofit would be banned from participating in political 
advocacy, the very kind of speech that the First Amendment is 
meant to protect most vigorously. The risk of censoring print 
advocacy—canonical communication in the marketplace of 
political ideas—was too great, and the distinction between film 
and print too ephemeral, to uphold the bar on “electioneering 
communications” as applied to Citizens United’s publication. 
Justice Stevens’ vision of a “reasonableness” standard does 
little to provide a workable solution to this particularly 
nettlesome First Amendment quagmire. Since his retirement, 
Justice Stevens, who dissented vehemently in Citizens United13 
and has called the Court’s decision “a giant step in the wrong 
direction,” has continued to advocate his position in a book, in the 
media, and even before Congress.14 He has proposed what he 
views as a simple solution to the campaign finance problem given 
the Court’s evident unwillingness to revisit its precedent. His 
solution would take the form of a constitutional amendment: 
“Neither the First Amendment nor any provision of this 
 
on the grounds that only the latter is “pretty classic electioneering,” id. at 66. Whether the 
Solicitor General’s office would have done better to concede the invalidity of the law as 
applied to Citizens United might warrant consideration, though not in this space. 
 12. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). 
 13. See id. at 393 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 14. See Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong 
Direction,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/
justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-in-wrong-direction.html; see also JOHN PAUL 
STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 
(2014). 
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Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the Congress or any 
state from imposing reasonable limits on the amount of money 
that candidates for public office, or their supporters, may spend in 
election campaigns.”15 
While Justice Stevens’s solution has the appearance of 
simplicity—bracketing the political impossibility of its 
endorsement by the supermajorities demanded in Article V16—its 
standard of “reasonableness” is bound to prove far too 
indeterminate in application for a First Amendment standard, 
where the notorious chilling effect of vague and nebulous criteria 
has long led judges to steer clear of the mushy standards that 
suffice for government work in such areas as the law of search and 
seizure. Even Justice Stevens found his own proposed 
amendment difficult to apply in a recent interview. The 
interviewer “asked whether the amendment would allow the 
government to prohibit newspapers from spending money to 
publish editorials endorsing candidates. He stared at the text of 
 
 15. Dollars and Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign 
Finance Will Affect 2014 and Beyond: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and 
Administration, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Justice John Paul Stevens), available at 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeHearings&ContentRecord_
id=3fb0fbe5-f5f6-4366-80fa-ab84c40746ff&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-
56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=1983a2a8-4fc3-4062-a50e-7997351c154b. 
 16. Full disclosure: The amendment proposed by Justice Stevens resembles one I 
drafted for Congressman Adam Schiff (D. Cal.), which he introduced in the 112th 
Congress, before I had concluded that such an amendment had no chance of passage. That 
amendment read: “Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to forbid Congress or 
the States from imposing content-neutral limitations on private campaign contributions or 
independent political campaign expenditures, or from enacting systems of public campaign 
financing, including those designed to restrict the influence of private wealth by offsetting 
campaign spending or independent expenditures with increased public funding.” H.R.J. 
Res. 111, 112th Cong. (2012). This amendment, as the text makes clear, was aimed not just 
at overturning Citizens United, but also the following year’s decision in Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), which struck down a 
state’s provision of “matching” funds for publicly funded candidates when their privately 
funded opponents (and their opponents’ independent supporters) spent above a certain 
amount. Even if an amendment—either Stevens’s or Schiff’s version—were politically 
plausible, it would still raise difficult questions. An amendment would have to distinguish 
between money spent producing ordinary films or books, on the one hand, presumably 
including ordinary films or books with a distinct political tilt or even a discernible message 
favorable to one or another candidate, and “independent political campaign 
expenditures,” on the other. This line, as the initial Citizens United oral argument 
demonstrated, is a dangerously thin and slippery one. Moreover, any amendment would 
have to thread the difficult needle of simultaneously inviting closer judicial scrutiny of 
incumbent-protective and otherwise self-serving limitations, while still giving Congress 
and state legislatures broader latitude to enact limitations consistent with democratic 
values. These difficulties should not foreclose the quest for a workable change to 
constitutional doctrine, through an amendment or otherwise, but should underscore the 
difficulty of revising the Court’s Citizens United holding and the wisdom of proceeding 
incrementally in this field. 
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his proposed amendment for a little while. ‘The “reasonable” 
would apply there,’ he said, ‘or might well be construed to apply 
there.’”17 This reasonableness standard requires the sort of “I 
know it when I see it” ad-hockery that plagued the Court’s mid-
century attempts to define obscenity.18 And such an approach 
lacks even the relatively more structured character of the kind of 
proportionality analysis that the former Chief Justice of Israel, 
Aharon Barak, has famously championed in his influential 
writings, writings that have apparently had an impact on the 
approach toward which Justice Breyer has gravitated in recent 
years.19 
Various rhetorical strategies employed by Citizens United 
opponents of late also fail to provide a doctrinally sustainable way 
forward. If we take seriously (and share) the Court’s aversion to 
anything that would permit book-banning—as we should—then 
both the rallying cry of “money isn’t speech” and “corporations 
aren’t people” are analytical non-starters. The argument that 
money doesn’t amount to speech and thus may be regulated 
without implicating the First Amendment carries little legal 
weight. As Joshua Matz and I recently wrote, “[A]llowing 
government to control who can spend enough to get heard on a 
grander scale would render freedom of speech illusory.”20 For, as 
Justice Kennedy made clear in his opinion in Citizens United, “All 
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money 
amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. 
The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was 
enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who 
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”21 The right to deliver a speech 
or perform a song obviously includes the right to speak or sing for 
a fee as well as the right to hire research assistants and pay for an 
accompanying guitarist, and the right to publish a newspaper or 
book certainly includes the right to spend money doing so and to 
earn a profit in the bargain. Even Justice Stevens acknowledged 
 
 17. Liptak, supra note 14. 
 18. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 121. 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–52 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 150 (noting that “Breyer’s Alvarez 
opinion was classic Breyer,” and that consequently it was “surprising (and intriguing) that 
Kagan joined it—and did so just one year after going along with Scalia’s entirely 
incompatible opinion in Brown”). 
 20. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 112. 
 21. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (citing Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Many persons 
can trace their funds to corporations, if not in the form of donations, then in the form of 
dividends, interest, or salary.”)). 
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in dissent that we live in “an age in which money and television 
ads are the coin of the campaign realm.”22 And, more generally, it 
seems pointless to argue that people have a right to engage in a 
particular activity but not to spend money doing so or to do so in 
return for monetary compensation. 
Undoubtedly, the right to engage in a particular type of 
conduct needn’t invariably entail the right to do so as part of an 
economic transaction: the right to have consensual sex or to 
become pregnant, for example, doesn’t inescapably imply the 
right to sell one’s sexual services to others or to become a 
surrogate mother for a price. It may well be, as Deborah Hellman 
has forcefully argued,23 that substantive liberties protected by the 
Constitution might usefully be divided into those that are 
accompanied by a right to expend one’s own resources optimizing 
the realization of the liberties at issue and those that are not: the 
right to the assistance of counsel pretty obviously includes a right 
to spend all one has available or can amass from supporters to 
prove one’s innocence, while the right to vote, when 
constitutionally protected, does not entail a right to purchase 
votes.24 But recognizing that commodification changes the 
constitutional equation hardly implies that the introduction of 
money into the picture automatically obliterates the application 
of otherwise governing constitutional principles.25 
The “corporations aren’t people” argument likewise fails to 
overcome the First Amendment concerns raised by Citizens 
United, and fails as well to address many of the concerns of those 
who oppose the decision. Corporations, including those organized 
for strictly business reasons, have long enjoyed at least some 
constitutional protections; under the constitutional system we 
currently enjoy, few would suggest that a State or the Federal 
Government could censor speech expenditures by an entity whose 
views it found anathema. This logic applies to for-profit 
corporations, non-profit corporations, and unions. Laissez-faire 
capitalism, happily, no longer dictates our constitutional destiny. 
 
 22. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 23. See Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 
(2011); Deborah Hellman, Presentation at Symposium on Advancing Democracy at 
Harvard Law School (Nov. 7, 2014). 
 24. Even the right to vote itself “was mentioned in the Constitution only in a 
backhanded way and was limited essentially to property-owning, taxpaying white males 
over the age of twenty-one.” Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional 
History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2003). 
 25. See generally TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 253–81. 
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Yet it would take a full-fledged constitutional revolution to strip 
all First Amendment protections from entities organized in a 
corporate form just because they exist only by virtue of a legal 
structure.26 
Justice Thurgood Marshall has articulated an alternative 
approach that may have more normative appeal, despite its recent 
rejection by the Court. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, the Court upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance 
Act, which prohibited corporations from using treasury money to 
make independent election-related expenditures. Justice 
Marshall argued that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence 
elections when it is deployed in the form of independent 
expenditures.”27 Implicit in this statement is not only a vigorously 
egalitarian approach to First Amendment law in the electoral 
context—one that in principle I would tend to favor—but also an 
approach that accompanies its egalitarian vision with a vision that 
assumes the legitimacy of permitting those whom we elect to 
govern our affairs to decide without judicial supervision which 
distributions of political influence depart from properly 
egalitarian criteria of power and which adhere to those criteria: 
the theory of Austin was that unsupervised legislative majorities 
should be entrusted to decide when allowing one person to speak 
(or spend money) has “unfairly” influenced complex political 
processes, whether by diluting or overwhelming the voices of 
others or in some other way.28 Although this theory appears to 
 
 26. On the applicability of the First Amendment to corporations, see First Nat’l Bank 
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780–86 (1978). Of course the mere applicability of the First 
Amendment does not suggest that the Constitution forbids imposing conditions on 
government-issued corporate charters to limit the ability of corporate managers to divert 
to political or religious causes the money entrusted to them by those who purchase shares 
not for the purpose of advocacy but strictly for the purpose of maximizing their income or 
wealth. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and 
Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012). To be sure, 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine stands for the proposition that government may 
not impose its will, without limit, on individuals or associations in exchange for government 
benefits. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 
(2013); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 
(1989); see also TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 253–81. Still, nothing in Buckley, Citizens 
United, or standard First Amendment theory suggests that the state may not trade the 
benefits of the corporate form for limits on the freedom of corporate managers to spend 
other people’s money—including that of investors and shareholders—however they wish. 
 27. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (emphasis added). 
 28. For a normative theory of “complex equality,” arguing that inequalities in one 
sphere (such as economic wellbeing) should not affect citizens’ standings in others (such 
as political discourse), see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
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provide a powerful justification for restricting corporate 
participation in the political process—or indeed for restricting 
how much amassed wealth individuals may expend to affect the 
workings of that process—it proved unable to overwhelm a 
stronger recent strain in First Amendment jurisprudence. That 
strain sets its face unalterably against permitting the state to 
determine, as if it were the conductor of our democratic choir, 
who may be permitted to speak, how much, and how loudly.29 
In any case, successfully challenging corporate personhood 
could not address many of the concerns raised by Citizens United, 
for at least two reasons. The first is that speech by non-natural 
persons like corporations and unions is not entirely (or even 
mostly) to blame for the recent spike in campaign spending by 
sources other than the candidates themselves or the political 
parties to which they belong: rather, superrich individuals are.30 
Indeed, large businesses—and for-profit corporations generally—
have a strong interest in not alienating large swaths of their 
customers or clients with controversial forms of political 
influence, such as donating directly to social and political causes 
that some of those constituent groups may not support and might 
indeed actively oppose (consider Target’s controversial 2010 
donation to a group opposing same-sex marriage).31 
The second reason is that, even if corporations were not 
regarded as “persons” within the meaning of various 
constitutional provisions, and even if restrictions on monetary 
outlays were not viewed as restrictions on the speech facilitated 
by those outlays, that would imply relatively little about the 
constitutional validity of particular restrictions on corporate 
spending on, or contribution to, various political causes. For 
individual citizens—persons, all—would still have a First 
Amendment right to receive the information and ideas (whether 
in the form of books, films, video displays, or digital distributions) 
that corporate expenditures can bring into the marketplace of 
information and ideas. Regardless of whether a particular source 
 
 29. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 98–99. Indeed, the fear of allowing the 
government to function as conductor seems to have animated Justice Kennedy’s decision 
in Town of Greece v. Galloway, in which he cautioned against “forc[ing] . . . legislatures . . . 
to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech.” 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014). 
 30. See Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-
citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html; see also Michael S. Kang, The End of 
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (2012) (describing corporate spending 
after Citizens United). 
 31. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 111–12. 
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of speech may claim federal constitutional protection for itself 
under the First Amendment, censoring that speech may abridge 
the “freedom of speech” that the First Amendment undoubtedly 
protects vis-à-vis would-be recipients of the ideas and information 
conveyed.32 Perhaps one of the strongest moves in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Citizens United was his pivot 
from the rights of speakers to the rights of listeners—their rights 
to hear and see whatever messages anyone or anything might 
choose to spend money to send their way and to make up their 
own minds about what to believe or to reject. “When Government 
seeks to use its full power . . . to command where a person may 
get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may 
not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.”33 At an abstract 
level, it’s difficult to disagree. 
B. OPPORTUNISTIC OVERREACH 
Thus, the Court’s decision was correct at least as applied to 
Citizens United and the movie it wished to spend corporate funds 
to disseminate. But five Justices used the case to create an 
opportunity to go much further. From the initial briefing to the 
final argument, the Court greatly expanded the scope of the issues 
presented. And in its decision, the Court dodged a multitude of 
paths to a narrower ruling.34 
The Court heard argument twice in Citizens United, and the 
scope of the case widened dramatically between its two 
appearances in the Marble Palace. The brief for Citizens United 
the first time its case reached the Court presented a suitably 
narrow question for review: “Whether the prohibition on 
corporate electioneering communications in the Bipartisan 
 
 32. For example, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the first 
Supreme Court decision striking down an Act of Congress on the basis of the Free Speech 
Clause, did so on the basis of listeners’ rights, at the behest, indirectly, of foreign speakers 
not themselves entitled to First Amendment protection. In addition, the First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause embodies not only the rights of citizens to express their 
views and address their grievances to government officials but also the structural principles 
that those who govern should not be cut off from any source of critique or complaint. The 
implications of that set of rights and principles for legislative lobbying in particular cannot 
be ignored in assessing what it would mean to overturn Citizens United. 
 33. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010). 
 34. I do not go as far as some, in the academy and on the federal bench, in 
propounding the general superiority of narrower holdings or judicial deference over 
broader decisions. See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1996). I do, however, fault the Citizens United Court for its overreach in that case, 
for the reasons set out in this section. 
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Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) can constitutionally be 
applied to a feature-length documentary film about a political 
candidate funded almost exclusively through noncorporate 
donations and made available to digital cable subscribers through 
Video On Demand.”35 Indeed, fully cognizant of the thick body of 
precedent disfavoring sweeping facial challenges in cases where 
holding a law unconstitutional as applied to the case at hand 
would suffice to give the challenger full relief, Citizens United had 
expressly abandoned the facial challenge it had originally 
launched in the district court. Despite the narrowness of the 
question thus presented, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito were eager to decide the broad constitutional issues 
potentially raised by the application of the federal statute at issue 
to cases not before the Court. Justice Souter, meanwhile, stood 
ready with a scathing dissent lambasting the majority for its 
unwarranted activism.36 Chief Justice Roberts, worried as ever 
about the potential damage to the Court’s credibility, engineered 
a compromise and ordered reargument, without any opinions 
being issued.37 
By the time the case was argued the second time, the Court 
on its own motion had immensely expanded the question 
presented for review: “For the proper disposition of this case, 
should the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce and the part of McConnell v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, which addresses the facial validity of Section 
203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002?”38 Justice 
Stevens described this scope-creep scathingly in his dissent: 
“Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature 
of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves 
an opportunity to change the law.”39 For a Court that had so often 
explained the narrowness of its rulings by appealing to the 
essentially passive nature of its jurisdiction, this was, for Justice 
Stevens, a departure that begged for justification. Indeed, the 
Court has often taken great pains to emphasize its perceived role 
 
 35. Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-
205). 
 36. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 92. For a discussion of the deliberations 
between the Justices regarding Citizens United, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 165–69 
(2012). 
 37. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 92. 
 38. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (No. 08-205) (citations omitted). 
 39. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 398 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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as a resolver of ordinary cases and controversies brought to it by 
litigants. On this view, the Court opines on the constitutional 
validity of contested exercises of power only to the degree 
required to resolve those cases, rather than serving as a roving 
constitutional tribunal rendering advisory opinions on the validity 
of laws.40 In Citizens United, the Court stepped enthusiastically 
but without a word of explanation into a broader role. 
Despite the Court-driven widening of the issues in the case, 
there remained several more limited rulings that the Court 
declined to adopt in its manifest rush to overrule Austin and to 
make sweeping declarations about the role of money in politics 
and about the sort of “corruption” whose avoidance might justify 
restricting supposedly independent expenditures of money in 
political campaigns. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens offered three potentially narrower 
grounds for decision: “First, the Court could have ruled, on 
statutory grounds, that a feature-length film distributed through 
video-on-demand does not qualify as an ‘electioneering 
communication’ under §203 of BCRA.”41 Although that kind of 
ruling might have served the objective of separating the 
application of the statute to the case at hand from the swath of 
applications implicated by the facial challenge the Court had 
deputized itself to address, it remains unclear just how that 
narrowing of the statute’s scope could have been reconciled either 
with the statute’s language or with its legislative history. Nor is it 
clear just how the Court would have explained distinguishing 
feature-length films from brief docudramas or, for that matter, 
from 90-second (or even shorter) television ads. Perhaps a strong 
dose of the maxim of constitutional avoidance would have done 
the trick for the time being.42 
 
 40. The prohibition on advisory opinions is foundational. See Felix Frankfurter, A 
Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (1924) (“[A]dvisory opinions 
are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere. The impact of actuality and the intensities of 
immediacy are wanting.”). This more modest vision of the judicial role was famously 
identified with the “passive virtues.” See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 
Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (setting out his theory). 
But see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (critiquing 
Bickel). 
 41. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 42. For a discussion of the canon of constitutional avoidance and its many different 
forms, see, for example, Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71; 
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000). For a discussion of the Roberts Court’s 
uneasy relationship with the constitutional avoidance canon, see generally Richard L. 
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Second, the Court could have read the statute to exempt 
“nonprofits that accept only a de minimis amount of money from 
for-profit corporations.”43 That, too, would have required the art 
of statutory interpretation to execute some heroic acrobatics, but 
the Roberts Court has not shrunk from such contortions in other 
contexts—as in its 2012 reading of the Affordable Care Act’s 
individual purchase “mandate” as not a mandate at all but a mere 
tax incentive;44 or in its suggestion, in the Hobby Lobby case, that 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s definition of the 
“persons” entitled to religious accommodation might somehow 
be confined to closely held Subchapter S corporations;45 or in its 
decision in the Bond case to avoid opining on the scope of the 
treaty power by simply refusing to apply the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act to an “unremarkable local 
offense.”46 Finally, the Court might have ruled, after all, only on 
Citizens United’s as-applied challenge, despite having sua sponte 
broadened the question presented so as to encompass the facial 
validity of the law at issue.47 
The Court’s decision instead to issue a sweeping facial ruling 
in Citizens United—a ruling vastly broader than the question 
posed by the case itself as the parties had chosen to litigate it—is 
but one example in a growing trend of opportunistic overreach by 
the Roberts Court. Chief Justice Roberts publicly claims a 
restrained role for the institution, having famously declared that 
the job of the Court is only to “call balls and strikes” rather than 
to “pitch or bat.”48 The past decade tells a different story, 
 
Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 181. 
 43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 44. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–95 (2012); TRIBE & 
MATZ, supra note 2, at 63–64. In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts first made clear that the 
mandate did not pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause and/or the 
Necessary and Proper Clause before ultimately upholding it as a valid exercise of the taxing 
power. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 62-63.  These initial constitutional proclamations 
might be understood as gratuitous, but they might also be framed as the Chief’s sole 
justification for the statutory stretch the latter holding entailed. 
 45. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–75 (2014) (discussing 
whether closely held corporations are “persons” under RFRA). 
 46.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014). As many of my colleagues 
have noted, the statute in Bond was hardly ambiguous, and thus stands as one of the more 
notable recent instances of statute-stretching. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the 
Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 89 (2014). 
 47. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 48. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
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however—one of active vice rather than passive virtue.49 The 
overreach of Citizens United is but one example of the Court 
resolving issues that are neither logically nor procedurally 
necessary to a full disposition of the case at hand. In Citizens 
United, the Court was presented with a narrow question about the 
constitutionality of campaign finance rules as applied to a 
nonprofit’s on-demand video, but it transformed the case into an 
opportunity to rule with a broad brush, putting essentially all 
future regulation of campaign finance in conspicuous jeopardy.50 
The Court followed a nearly identical pattern in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.,51 a case about the meaning of the Alien Tort 
Statute, among our nation’s earliest and most cryptic statutes. In 
Kiobel, the Court initially heard oral arguments on a relatively 
narrow question, ordered reargument on a considerably broader 
question, and then decided the case on the broader grounds. The 
parallel between this procedural history and that of Citizens 
United is striking. And in a wide range of other cases, on issues as 
diverse as the constitutionality of Obamacare, labor law, and class 
action law, the majority (usually consisting of the Chief Justice 
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) has been 
criticized—often by other Justices—for issuing broader-than-
necessary opinions.52 
* * * 
 
56 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf. 
 49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 50. A possible defense of this move might be that there is no coherent way, consistent 
with the Court’s judicial rather than legislative role, for it essentially to redraft the statute 
at issue by drawing lines that would—as neatly as would be required in the First 
Amendment arena—sever the universe of applications that the Court could invalidate 
from the residue of applications that the Court could leave intact. Absent the formal ability 
to remand the case to Congress for modification of the statute, the Court may have viewed 
its hands as being tied. 
 51. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 52. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 n.12 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(noting that she “see[s] no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not 
outcome determinative,” given that five Justices would uphold the individual mandate on 
Taxing Power grounds); Knox v. SEIU, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I concur only in the judgment, however, because I cannot 
agree with the majority’s decision to address unnecessarily significant constitutional issues 
well outside the scope of the questions presented and briefing. By doing so, the majority 
breaks our own rules and, more importantly, disregards principles of judicial restraint that 
define the Court’s proper role in our system of separated powers.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561–62 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (arguing, in a class action case, that the Court should have remanded the case for 
further proceedings under a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than 
“disqualif[ying] the class at the starting gate,” id. at 2562). 
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This analysis tells a very different story about Citizens United 
than the one the public typically hears. I believe that McCain-
Feingold was indeed unconstitutional as applied to the facts of 
Citizens United. But the decision nonetheless represents a 
worrisome trend by the Court: reaching out to decide issues not 
squarely before it. In Citizens United, that move led the Court first 
to formally broaden the questions presented, then to issue a facial 
rather than as-applied ruling. Both were mistakes. Yet judicial 
overreach is far from the only thing wrong with Citizens United. 
The case also represents the Roberts Court’s overly narrow view 
of the values that should animate First Amendment 
jurisprudence. In the next section, I take up that issue. 
II. RECONSTRUCTING CAMPAIGN FINANCE THEORY 
AND DOCTRINE 
The public discourse surrounding Citizens United makes 
clear that the case is about far more than its precise holding and 
the analysis underlying that holding: it is about the kind of 
democracy our Constitution should be understood to create and 
the types of governing arrangements it should be understood to 
put in place. This section looks beyond Citizens United itself to 
First Amendment jurisprudence more generally and reframes the 
normative questions at stake in that area of law, rather than 
proffering particular doctrinal reforms. 
Citizens United highlights a fundamental tension between 
two conceptions of democracy—a tension with which neither the 
majority nor the dissent, nor the partisans on either side, fully 
reckons. At one pole lies the egalitarianism that has long been a 
central strand of our democratic tradition. The social contract 
tradition of Hobbes and Locke, from which the founders drew 
many of their ideas, incorporates an ideal of equality: the social 
contract (be it real, tacit, or hypothetical) is one between all 
individuals, each of whom is on equal footing in entering into 
society.53 The framers repeatedly affirmed a commitment to civic 
 
 53. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 120–21 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 
University Press 1991) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330–33 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1967) (1690). Although both Hobbes and 
Locke considered women to be persons for the purposes of the creation of the social 
contract, their views on women in the private sphere did not, of course, approach the 
modern idea of equality between the sexes. For in-depth discussions regarding the role of 
women in the political and social philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, see FEMINIST 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THOMAS HOBBES (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Joanne H. Wright eds., 
2012); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Kirstie M. 
McClure eds., 2007). 
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equality in the construction of a representative system, a 
commitment exemplified by James Madison’s Federalist 57: 
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not 
the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the 
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more 
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The 
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United 
States.54 
In the same era, the Constitution and Bill of Rights 
incorporated principles of civic equality. We need recall but two 
examples long predating Reconstruction and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: the Constitution bars the 
United States from granting titles of nobility,55 and the First 
Amendment prevents government from privileging any religion 
or its members over other religions or over nonbelievers.56 
(Although notions of “civic equality” long excluded some groups, 
most notably women and racial minorities, those notions are 
conceptually compatible with—and perhaps even demand—the 
more inclusive polity that we have only belatedly begun to 
achieve.) 
In the modern era, these ideals of civic equality were clearly 
and powerfully embodied in the Supreme Court’s 
reapportionment cases. Several decisions in the early 1960s, most 
notably Baker v. Carr57 and Reynolds v. Sims,58 required that 
legislative districts (both state and federal) be equal in population. 
Embedded in these cases was a theory of equal representation, 
 
 54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). This 
being said, the framers had a notoriously limited and inherently unequal conception of 
political equality. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United 
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“When the Founding Fathers used this 
phrase in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America’s citizens. ‘We the 
People’ included, in the words of the framers, ‘the whole Number of free Persons.’ On a 
matter so basic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded, although 
they were counted for representational purposes—at three-fifths each. Women did not 
gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years.” (internal citations omitted)). 
For my reflections on this issue, see Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praise the 
Constitution or to Bury It?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (arguing that “the Constitution 
of Thurgood Marshall is . . . incomplete” and that “[t]o disparage the work of 1787 is to 
overlook those institutional structures that made it possible for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, from the 1950’s to the 1970’s, after a century of national blindness, both to 
see, and to make the country face, what had to be done to redeem the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment’s promise”). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 56. Id. amend. I. 
 57. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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now famously expressed by the slogan “one person, one vote”: the 
Constitution, with the conspicuous exception of the composition 
of the United States Senate, requires that all citizens have an 
equal voice—at least when it comes to voting in legislative 
elections. This reapportionment revolution mattered not only in 
theory, but in practice: political scientists have documented the 
many ways in which it affected concrete policy outcomes, noting 
the “singular conclusion” that “[t]he equalization of 
representation led directly to an equalization of the distribution 
of public expenditures—who got what.”59 Civic equality, in other 
words, is directly related to policy results. 
Despite the strength of this egalitarian tradition, it is 
threatened by a competing, non-egalitarian tradition that results 
from the intersection between our political and economic systems. 
Capitalism has resulted in different interest groups having 
differing quantities of resources,60 which those groups deploy in 
the public sphere in pursuit of their preferred policy outcomes—
with some citizens being far more able to influence policy than 
others. It was, of course, this inequality that George Orwell 
famously parodied in Animal Farm, with its unforgettable 
proclamation that “all animals are equal, but some are more equal 
than others.”61 
This unequal distribution of potential influence operates 
through a variety of mechanisms: the increasing cost of 
campaigns, compelling candidates to spend more time fundraising 
and leading them to avoid embracing policy positions that would 
antagonize their potential sources of campaign funding; the 
maturation of the lobbying industry as a major force in 
Washington and nearly every state capital; and, most recently, the 
rise of supposedly “independent” campaign expenditures as a new 
means for powerful interests to affect electoral outcomes and, 
whatever the outcomes, to win preferential access and wield 
disproportionate influence. While some scholars, often called 
“pluralists,”62 have lauded these changes as simply expanded 
 
 59. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: 
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 15 
(2008). 
 60. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 336–76 
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013); David Singh Grewal, The 
Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 632–44 (2014) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, 
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 2014) (2013)). 
 61. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946). 
 62. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961). 
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means of civic participation, it was over a half century ago that 
E.E. Schattschneider first noted that “[t]he flaw in the pluralist 
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class 
accent.”63 More recently, political scientists have made a powerful 
empirical case that American government is systematically far 
more responsive to the interests of the wealthy and well-
organized than to the interests of ordinary citizens.64 
The fact that government is more responsive to the 
preferences, priorities and interests of some citizens than others is 
perhaps endemic to any attempt to run an egalitarian polity 
alongside a non-egalitarian economy. But the phenomenon is 
particularly worrisome in the era of what many have called a 
“great divergence.” In what is now a well-known story, over the 
past four decades America has witnessed ever-growing (and too 
often racially skewed) gaps between rich and poor: in income, 
wealth, health, educational outcomes, and even in family 
stability.65 As the lived experiences of the wealthy and the poor 
diverge, it becomes increasingly significant that the political 
system is more responsive—and is widely understood to be more 
responsive—to the preferences of one group than to those of the 
other. The Citizens United dissenters rightly highlight these 
inequalities in political access and power, while the majority 
largely overlooks them and incants bromides about how a key 
precept of our First Amendment tradition is that government may 
not address such inequalities through seeking to “level the playing 
field” of political speech. 
To be sure, those bromides reflect important truths about the 
dangers of governmental efforts to decide what a “level playing 
field” in the world of ideas and information would look like. But 
those are not the only important truths to be considered. The 
fundamental dynamic—a dynamic in which the non-egalitarian 
character of America’s economic system undermines the 
egalitarianism of our core political ideals—is complicated by three 
dichotomies that run through campaign finance law. 
 
 63. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960). 
 64. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL 
PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH 
RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); KAY LEHMAN 
SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA, & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: 
UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2012). 
 65. See, e.g., TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING 
INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2012). 
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The first is the divide between what might be called 
“trusting” and “skeptical” views of democracy.66 Recognizing that 
this is a huge oversimplification, one can sum up the contrast this 
way: on the more trusting view, the greatest threat to democracy 
comes from outside influences (especially moneyed influences), 
and courts should by and large trust the political branches to 
protect the political system against those harms. The more 
skeptical view, by contrast, focuses on the threat from within and 
is wary of letting the political branches regulate without 
significant judicial supervision the processes by which they are 
elected, with a particular fear that legislatures will enact 
incumbent-protection provisions at the expense of a robust, self-
correcting democracy. On this more skeptical view, a primary role 
of the independent judiciary is to regulate the political process 
when the elected branches cannot be trusted to do so 
disinterestedly. It is a view that fits firmly into the political process 
tradition. It can plausibly claim to be a descendant of the Warren 
Court reapportionment cases.67 The Roberts Court’s campaign 
finance jurisprudence, building on decisions going back to the 
mid-1970s,68 has at times adopted this distinctly skeptical 
approach, perhaps summed up best by the Chief Justice’s blunt 
statement in 2014 that “those who govern should be the last 
people to help decide who should govern.”69 
While concerns about such self-serving distortions in the 
electoral process certainly have merit in some contexts,70 those 
 
 66. Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of Hope and Fear, 124 YALE L.J. 528 (2014) 
(reviewing ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2014)) (comparing Robert Post’s trusting view of democracy with 
Winston Churchill’s skeptical view of democracy). 
 67. The canonical sources on political process theory are United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1980). 
 68. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 69. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014). This view is not new, 
however; as early as Buckley v. Valeo, the Court’s first modern campaign finance decision, 
the Court noted that “equalization of permissible campaign expenditures might serve not 
to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who lacked 
substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.” 
424 U.S. at 56–57. This, however, does little to explain the Court’s divergent approaches 
to incumbent protection in the campaign finance context and the redistricting context. See 
Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004). 
 70.  Notably, they do not have merit in every context: where regulations are passed 
by popular initiative, it is far from clear how any presumption of self-serving distortion is 
warranted. See infra note 78 (discussing Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011)). 
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concerns should not be permitted to eclipse other, equally serious 
if not more pervasive, sources of worry. I have in mind particularly 
the worry about what some label “corruption,” not in the narrow, 
quid-pro-quo sense of outright bribery—“I give you my money, I 
get your vote in favor of this or that measure that helps me and 
my friends”—but in a general, more diffuse sense. In particular, 
corruption can be understood in the broader sense of systemic 
corrosion, exemplified by purchasing the gratitude, if not the 
ongoing dependence, of the political officials whom one assists 
financially in their quest for office and power. 
The Citizens United Court took the narrowest possible view 
of corruption, maintaining that the only legitimate government 
interest in this field is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption. 
But, as many have argued in response, quid pro quo corruption is 
far too narrow a governmental interest to identify as 
constitutionally relevant.71 It is an interest that does not begin to 
reflect the full stakes at issue in the campaign finance realm: the 
health of American democracy itself. Unless the notion of 
interests sufficiently compelling to count in the First Amendment 
calculus is strangely truncated to exclude interests this 
fundamental simply because they appear imprecise or diffuse, 
courts must recognize a compelling interest in combating 
corruption broadly defined as a distortion in the political process, 
understood to include a deviation from the ideal of equal 
representation embodied in Federalist 57 and the 
reapportionment cases.72 In a republican system of government—
a system that Article IV commands the United States to 
guarantee—it is a legitimate and indeed compelling goal of 
legislation, both state and federal, to ensure that officeholders and 
their staff have no greater incentive to meet with, to respond 
favorably to the approaches of, or to be susceptible to influence 
by, those who either have supported their candidacies financially 
or can be expected to do so in the future. This foundational ideal 
may be unattainable in practice, so long as we have private 
 
 71. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011); ROBERT C. POST, 
CITIZENS DIVIDED (2014); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 341 (2009). For an argument that the Supreme Court should be reluctant to even 
define corruption, see Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing 
Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013). 
 72. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 71 (advocating reforms to combat “dependence 
corruption,” which leads to policy distortion); Teachout, supra note 71, at 410–11 (arguing 
“not . . . that corruption is a compelling state interest that might, in some cases, justify 
restrictions on speech, but that there are two competing, equally important constitutional 
interests at stake: free speech and the anti-corruption principle”). 
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financing of political campaigns, but various policy decisions can 
move us either closer to or further away from it.73 Moreover, 
judicial supervision can help ensure that legislatures do not enact 
incumbent-protection measures to entrench themselves at the 
expense of the openness of the system. The Court’s master rule in 
this area should fall under the overarching rubric of judicial 
supervision to prevent all failures of representation, whether they 
are brought about by actors inside or outside the political 
branches.74 
The Court in Citizens United at places seems to acknowledge 
both the empirical reality and the public belief that those who 
provide the most financial assistance gain the most access and thus 
the most influence75—but, in what amounts to the most 
paradoxical about-face in the decision, the Court elsewhere flatly 
denies both that truth and the widespread perception of that 
truth.76 It is unclear whether the Court is simply contradicting 
itself or is saying that, genuine as this worry might be and however 
much it might erode the foundations of the ideal of one-
person/one-vote, it simply cannot justify government-imposed 
restrictions on speech. Insofar as the Justices in the Citizens 
United majority are concerned with inequality and with this 
broader sort of corruption—and I do not purport to know their 
views on this matter beyond the words on the page—it is certainly 
true that they are less concerned with those issues than with 
preserving the laissez-faire ideal that individuals or groups may 
spend their own money (and, evidently, the money entrusted to 
them by investors) to help some people get elected and others get 
defeated, and, in turn, to help some policies get chosen and others 
get rejected. 
Yet why the free speech ideal would have to be fatally 
corrupted by suitable attention to this broader worry about 
corruption remains for the reader to imagine; the Court largely 
 
 73. For a more detailed discussion of the issue, see TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 
104. To the degree that First Amendment jurisprudence does require that content-focused 
restrictions on speech be reasonably effective, the doctrine would of course need to be 
revisited if anything short of an across-the-board restriction on private spending in the 
political arena were to survive efficacy review. 
 74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“If elected officials 
succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their 
best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for 
concern.”). 
 76. See id. at 360 (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause 
the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is 
political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.”). 
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assumes its conclusion, in a worrisome substitution of ipse dixits 
for legal reasoning. It fails to make a coherent argument to show 
that it would be infeasible to carve a more sensitive middle path 
between the seemingly naïve willingness of the Citizens United 
dissenters (and of leading critics of Citizens United like Robert 
Post77) to trust those in positions of political power to enact 
campaign finance reforms that protect democracy more than they 
preserve incumbency, and the seemingly boundless skepticism of 
the Roberts Court majority in its campaign finance cases.78 I favor 
such a middle path, which calls on judges to be skeptical of 
campaign finance reforms that seem calculated to entrench or 
empower incumbents, but more trusting when reforms prevent 
corruption and there is little or no evidence that they have undue 
pro-incumbent purposes or effects. This path is admittedly a 
treacherous one to blaze, as it requires deep judicial engagement 
with hard empirical questions: most notably, the tasks of 
measuring the incumbency advantage, levels of corruption, and 
incentives created by various funding schemes, and of assessing 
the degree to which those schemes were in fact designed with 
those effects in mind. But the difficulty of pursuing this course 
should not foreclose judicial attempts to distinguish among 
different types of campaign finance regulations: even if the Court 
were to misjudge some regulations and consequently proved 
 
 77. For a recent statement of Dean Post’s views, see POST, supra note 71. 
 78. For examples of the Roberts Court striking down state or federal campaign 
finance regulations, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down federal 
aggregate limits on individual donations); Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 
(2012) (striking down Montana’s ban on corporate independent political expenditures in 
state elections); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011) (striking down Arizona’s matching funds provision); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 
(2008) (striking the federal “Millionaire’s Amendment”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 
551 U.S. 449 (2007) (striking down a federal restriction on so-called “issue advertising” by 
third parties); and Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s 
contribution limit as unconstitutionally low). The Roberts Court’s skeptical presumption 
of corrupt self-dealing in the passage of campaign finance reforms is particularly difficult 
to defend in the context of regulations, like that at issue in Bennett, enacted by popular 
initiative. 131 S. Ct. at 2813. In any case, this heightened sensitivity to the corruption of 
self-dealing incumbents is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s near-total insensitivity to 
non-quid pro quo corruption. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The Court may 
have been particularly skeptical of the Bennett matching funds scheme because it provided 
publicly financed candidates with compensatory funding taking into account not only the 
opposing privately financed candidate’s own spending, but also the spending of the 
opponent’s independent supporters. 131 S. Ct. at 2813. Acting on its (doubtful) assumptions 
that independent groups are truly independent and that their expenditures are unlikely to 
be helpful to the candidates they support, the majority highlighted the “disparity in 
control” that the scheme involved: the publicly financed candidate would have full control 
over the public matching funds, while the privately financed candidate would be, in a sense, 
penalized for the expenditures of groups outside his or her control. Id. at 2819. 
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either too skeptical or too trusting in some cases, it would almost 
certainly do better than it has done under its current approach of 
essentially blanket skepticism. 
The second dichotomy is between doctrinaire libertarianism 
and less purely libertarian approaches to campaign finance—and 
to speech generally. A purely libertarian approach to campaign 
finance, much like a libertarian approach to economic regulation, 
essentially assumes that there exists such a thing as a neutral 
baseline, an “unregulated” marketplace of speech, of free and fair 
elections, and of human interactions generally. The huge 
shortcoming of this view, familiar to nearly everyone since the 
early twentieth century if not before, is that the political system 
(and the system of laws constructed by politics) does not preexist 
the state and is not a product of “nature” but, rather, is constituted 
by an elaborate system of man-made rules.79 The realist critique 
of economic libertarianism dating to the early 1900s sheds light on 
a fundamental weakness of an essentially laissez-faire approach in 
the campaign finance realm. Economic libertarianism was 
undermined by the growing recognition (or, for those who still 
view the issue as contestable, the growing belief) that not only the 
rules of corporate formation and limited corporate liability but 
also the even more basic rules of property, contract, and tort were 
all products not of a “brooding omnipresence in the sky”80 but of 
positive law.81 Needless to say, the entire edifice of elections and 
campaigns is itself the product of rules established by law, both 
federal and state. Not to make too fine a point of it, most of the 
means through which election-related speech is transmitted to the 
public (including, obviously, the postal service and the airwaves, 
both radio and television) are creations of the state as well. Given 
that the legal rules construct the campaign and electoral system in 
the first instance, it should not come as a surprise that the search 
for something to hang onto as a “neutral, regulation-free” 
baseline departures from which are deemed constitutionally 
suspect is a search for something that just isn’t there. The question 
in constructing a system of campaign finance, therefore, should 
not be: What business has government interfering in the 
unregulated operations of a supposedly “natural” and politically 
 
 79. For a small sampling of the vast literature on these issues, see, for example, 
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 567–86; J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist 
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Tribe, supra note 4. 
 80. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 81. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 238–45 (1985). 
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unmediated marketplace of information and ideas? Rather, the 
question should be: Given that the whole edifice is constructed by 
political choices, which set of choices will best accommodate the 
conflicting values that our constitutional framework, prominently 
including the First Amendment, should be understood to 
embody? 
The Roberts Court seems to have answered this question by 
excising not just egalitarianism but realism from the First 
Amendment, at least in the campaign finance realm. In Arizona 
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,82 for 
example, the Court took to a new extreme the long-established 
principle that “equalizing” or “leveling” citizens’ ability to 
influence politics is categorically forbidden.83 Bennett involved a 
state program in which publicly financed candidates were offered 
“matching” public funds if their privately financed opponents 
(and the opponents’ independent supporters) spent more than a 
certain amount. The Court saw this offset provision as 
unconstitutionally penalizing the privately financed candidate’s 
right to spend his own money without limit. Thus, the Court now 
forbids not just straightforward restrictions on politicians’ ability 
to raise and spend money, but also public financing schemes that, 
on the margins, might discourage the raising and spending of 
additional amounts of money by providing public funds to one’s 
opponents to partially offset such financial exertions. 
Of course, the logic of Bennett could be somewhat arbitrarily 
limited to schemes that involve matching-fund triggers of the sort 
that Arizona had enacted. And yet, its logic could just as easily be 
extended. Bennett suggests the Court is wary not just of “leveling 
down” but also of “leveling up.” The fact that the privately 
financed candidates remained free to spend to their hearts’ 
content did not save the law. The Court was concerned not simply 
with their liberty to spend, but with their liberty to spend more 
than their publicly funded opponents are permitted to spend with 
the aid of the public fisc. Thus, Bennett implied a sharp distinction 
between private funds earned in the private economy (sacrosanct, 
democratic) and public funds delivered by the state (suspect, 
distortive). The Court not only rejected the notion that egalitarian 
values might be latent in the First Amendment or in the structure 
of our Constitution, but also adopted the libertarian notion of a 
 
 82. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 83. Id. at 2825–26; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). But see supra note 78 
for a possible narrower understanding of the concerns underlying Bennett. 
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pre-regulatory “natural” distribution of political speech that can 
only be warped by governmental interference. 
The third and final distinction is that between fully theorized 
views and what could be described as “incompletely theorized” 
approaches.84 A purely libertarian approach to campaign finance 
is an example of a “fully theorized” approach—with a normative 
foundation and clear implications for policy that stem from that 
normative foundation. As an alternative to this fully theorized 
approach, there are two options. First, it could be replaced by a 
different but no less fully theorized approach. Possible examples 
from democratic theory include deliberative democracy and 
communitarianism. Deliberative democracy, as the name 
suggests, focuses on creating processes through which members of 
the polity reason together about the public good.85 
Communitarian views often define liberty less in negative than in 
positive terms—less in terms of the absence of government-
imposed restraints than in terms of active participation in self-
government, with particular focus on situating the individual in 
the context of the larger polity.86 Both kinds of theory contrast 
starkly with purely “aggregative” or “pluralist” views of 
democracy, in which the only legitimate purpose of the political 
process is to aggregate citizens’ pre-existing preferences. 
Although they differ in substantial ways, both deliberative and 
civic republican theories treat democracy as more than mere 
aggregation, but rather as a forum for developing a shared 
conception of the common good and then approximating it in 
reality. 
Rather than choosing one of these fully theorized 
approaches, however—something that a multimember Court, not 
to mention a vast and diverse society, cannot be expected to do—
one might simply aim to achieve what have been called 
“incompletely theorized” agreements on particular important 
 
 84. For a detailed discussion and support of “incompletely theorized agreements,” 
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1733 (1995). 
 85. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1996). For an application of deliberative-democratic theory to the 
problem of for-profit corporations participating in politics, see Samuel J. Barr, 
Deliberative Democracy and Corporate Political Advertising (Mar. 2011) (unpublished 
A.B. honors thesis, Harvard College) (on file with Harvard University Library). 
 86. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); 
cf. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005); Laurence H. Tribe, Federalism as the Architecture of Liberty: A 
Comment on Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence (Mar. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
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issues.87 On the view this relatively modest aspiration suggests, we 
need not agree upon any one fully theorized view of democracy 
in order to draw on a range of theories and identify their areas of 
intersection and points of tangency to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the purely libertarian view. Despite the appeal of 
choosing one theory of democracy and building a system of legal 
rules accordingly, we might as well recognize the truth that judges 
are not, and should not aspire to become, philosopher-kings. They 
need not—and, for both theoretical and institutional reasons, 
should not—endorse and implement a single theory of 
democracy. Instead, they should draw from all the legitimate 
intellectual traditions available to them, to form what John Rawls 
described as an “overlapping consensus,” in which different 
normative conceptions of justice, even if not wholly consistent, 
can together form a common if not necessarily permanent 
foundation for political institutions.88 
These seemingly theoretical considerations should not be 
regarded as beside the point for purposes of workaday 
jurisprudence. They make a huge practical difference. In 
particular, the theoretical framework that we adopt in the 
campaign finance context directly implicates First Amendment 
doctrinal analysis. To give but one example, traditional First 
Amendment analysis typically requires that courts answer the 
question of which proffered government interests are 
“legitimate” or “compelling.” But that question cannot be 
answered in a theoretical vacuum: doing so requires at least a 
provisional theory of democracy. A minimally theorized 
agreement on basic principles may be sufficient, but at least some 
conceptual work needs to be done. The Justices simply cannot 
avoid acting as democratic theorists in adjudicating campaign 
finance cases under the First Amendment. For the First 
Amendment, like much of the constitutional text, is a broadly 
worded statement without a clear and uncontested meaning. It is 
the Supreme Court’s job, in conversation with its predecessors 
and with its contemporaries throughout society, to develop the 
constitutional common law that gives the First Amendment’s text 
a more determinate meaning.89 The quest for a mode of 
 
 87. See Sunstein, supra note 84. 
 88. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1987); see also Justice David H. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th 
Commencement Address, 124 HARV. L. REV. 429, 433 (2010) (“The explicit terms of the 
Constitution, in other words, can create a conflict of approved values, and the explicit 
terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict when it arises.”). 
 89. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 51 (2010). 
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interpretation that provides perfect clarity to the First 
Amendment is chimerical. Courts must act as democratic 
theorists, whether they wish to or not. Even if this is a second-best 
reality that is not ideal in a democratic society, it is nonetheless 
our reality, and it is almost certainly preferable to the imaginable 
alternatives. And, given the inevitability of democratic theory, the 
Court should favor minimally theorized agreements, ones that 
seek to synthesize competing conceptions of democracy, rather 
than the single-minded libertarianism that we have seen in 
campaign finance cases in recent years. 
The Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida 
Bar90 may represent a promising exception to this single-minded 
trend. There the Court, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the 
bare majority, upheld Florida’s ban on personal solicitation of 
campaign funds by judicial candidates. While this decision may 
simply reflect an ad hoc judiciary-only exception to the Court’s 
libertarian streak,91 its premises seem hard to square with Citizens 
United’s unwillingness to treat public concern about the 
dependence of officeholders on those who fund their elections as 
a compelling reason to restrict campaign-related speech. Though 
Chief Justice Roberts may believe that it’s more important for the 
constitutional system that people trust judges to be apolitical 
umpires92 than that they have confidence in the fairness and 
openness of the political process, such a distinction seems 
untenable and will hopefully, in time, be corrected.  
* * * 
Given this theoretical backdrop, how should the Court 
ideally go about adjudicating campaign finance cases? As a matter 
of prediction, only a substantially reconstituted Court would 
pursue a path different from the one the Roberts Court appears 
determined to follow—a path toward essentially invalidating all 
substantial constraints on campaign spending and campaign 
contribution. I have elsewhere argued that pursuing a 
constitutional amendment to reform this area of the law is almost 
certainly a lost cause.93 I do not intend to examine here the 
 
 90. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 91. See id. at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment is not abridged for 
the benefit of the Brotherhood of the Robe.”); cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 
618 (1995) (treating public perceptions of the legal profession as important enough to 
warrant content-based and even lopsided restrictions on speech by attorneys to accident 
victims). 
 92. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 16. 
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prospects for reform in terms of beating the rich at their own game 
the way my colleague Larry Lessig hopes to do with his Mayday 
Pac94—other than to say that, even if such efforts were, 
implausibly, to result in the election of people committed to 
“doing the right thing” once in office, that would beg the question 
of what “the right thing” would be: asking officeholders to pledge 
that they will listen only to those whom they are constitutionally 
elected to represent would leave unanswered huge questions 
about whether the “right” theory of democracy requires elected 
officials to disregard the views of those outside their immediate 
constituency, and to disregard as well the intensity of various 
groups’ convictions about what policies those officials should 
pursue, as measured by the willingness of those groups to put their 
money where their mouths are. So let me confine my discussion 
to the more modest question: What should the Court have done 
in Citizens United, once it made the dubious choice of answering 
a question that the parties had not asked, the (hard) question of 
McCain-Feingold’s facial validity as opposed to the (easy) 
question of its validity as applied to the Hillary film? 
Reconstructing McCain-Feingold, saving its valid 
applications while striking down its invalid ones, would have been 
tempting but extremely difficult in Citizens United. It would have 
at the very least required judicially drawing lines that Congress 
had chosen not to draw in drafting the law, lines presumably 
distinguishing ordinary, for-profit business corporations from 
overtly ideological, nonprofits like Citizens United itself. And, in 
the course of that architectural and essentially legislative 
undertaking, that reconstruction would have required revisiting 
doctrines about just how constitutionally suspect speaker-based 
lines are and what it would take to make such lines survive the 
appropriate level or form of First Amendment scrutiny. 
However the Court proceeded, it should probably have been 
less preoccupied with pure listener-protection and with the 
protection of “speech” without regard to speaker structure or 
identity. Yes, listeners do and should matter greatly in First 
Amendment analysis. But the speaker is relevant as well—and is 
particularly relevant given concerns about failures of 
representation. There is some indication that the Roberts Court 
may be receptive to this sort of approach in at least some contexts. 
In 2012, in an unexplained order, the Court departed from its 
 
 94. See Evan Osnos, Embrace the Irony, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), available 
at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/embrace-irony. 
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preoccupation with listeners in the campaign finance context and 
upheld a flat ban on campaign-related spending by foreign 
persons.95 Given that foreign spending in American elections 
dramatically implicates the rights of listeners, and given that 
speakers from particular areas of the world may have things to say 
that are of unique value and importance to American citizens who 
hail from those areas or may have close relatives still living there, 
the Court must have been concerned principally with the 
speaker’s side of the First Amendment ledger in upholding the 
ban on foreign contributions. While the lack of a written opinion 
means that we can only speculate on what various justices may 
have had in mind, it’s hard not to suppose that at least some of 
those in the Citizens United majority might have been concerned 
with distortions of representation: allowing foreign donors to 
influence American elections could cause elected officials to be 
responsive to those donors rather than to their voting 
constituents. Reasoning of this sort could easily be applied to 
donations by entities that, like foreign citizens, are not permitted 
to vote in American elections—like unions and, of course, 
corporations, including transparently ideological nonprofits. It’s 
difficult not to recall the moment during the State of the Union 
speech in which President Obama, shortly after Citizens United 
had been decided, speculated that the decision would mean 
possible foreign influence over our elections, only to find Justice 
Alito visibly but silently mouthing the words “Not true.”96 
Moreover, the foreign-donors case demonstrates the power of a 
minimally theorized approach to campaign finance—we need not 
agree on a single, comprehensive theory of representation to 
agree that some actions (buying of American elections by foreign 
donors) falls outside any plausibly defensible theory. 
*** 
The Supreme Court’s sin in Citizens United is not that it has 
been wrong to recognize and embrace the libertarian values that 
inhere in the First Amendment. But the libertarian campaign 
finance law the Court has developed fails in the broader project 
vital to First Amendment jurisprudence: the sensitive 
accommodation of competing constitutional values. The Court 
has not only underemphasized the egalitarian strain in First 
Amendment law—it has rejected that strain outright. And it has 
 
 95. See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (mem.) (2012). 
 96. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, 
N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A12. 
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failed to recognize the range of plainly legitimate conceptions of 
democracy that Americans hold, instead privileging one view, 
democracy-by-financial-contributions, above all others. 
How to understand the First Amendment, and deciding how 
it should blend libertarian, egalitarian, and democratic values, is 
among our most difficult constitutional questions. Yet the Court’s 
majority, in its campaign finance jurisprudence, has treated it as 
an easy (indeed, almost as a self-answering) question, with one set 
of values trumping all others. In so doing, it has reached out to 
decide issues not squarely before it while implausibly 
downplaying, and at times all but denying, the baleful corruption 
of American politics by means short of criminal bribery—by 
means that are lamentable precisely because they are lawful. 
Faced with weighty normative choices, the wiser path would be 
for the Court to answer only the narrow questions it must resolve 
to decide the specific controversies presented to it; to be 
particularly attentive to empirical realities; and—most of all—to 
avoid going “all in” on a single, highly contestable theory of 
democracy and on a single, uncompromisingly skeptical, 
orientation toward the motives and workings of the political 
branches. 
There may be satisfaction in such intellectual absolutism, in 
painting in bright colors and with a broad brush. But a wiser path 
recognizes the difficulty of the normative issues at the heart of 
campaign finance law and the irreconcilable values that recent 
cases implicate. 
This is not a plea for deciding any particular case one way or 
another. Indeed, as I stated at the outset, I believe that the Court 
rendered the correct judgment in favor of the right claimed by the 
corporation that sought to distribute a video critical of Hillary 
Clinton in Citizens United. This is instead a plea for greater 
judicial open-mindedness, sensitivity to nuance, and a measure of 
old-fashioned humility. Just as these issues cannot be intelligently 
settled by slogans like “money isn’t speech” and “corporations 
aren’t people,” so too they cannot be satisfactorily settled by 
proclamations that independent expenditures don’t corrupt or by 
sweeping assumptions that government regulation of spending on 
political speech always equals censorship. The political branches 
should be left with some tools to regulate the alchemy through 
which economic inequality perpetuates itself by transmutation 
into political and civic inequality. The form that these regulations 
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may take is properly policed by the federal judiciary,97 but Citizens 
United appears to represent a much broader and more perilous 
assertion of judicial power in campaign finance law and in First 
Amendment law more generally: unrelenting skepticism of 
legislators’ motives, a pathologically rigid doctrinal absolutism, 
and a naïve, unrealistic economic libertarianism and blindness to 
political corruption. 
 
 97. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 101 (“[I]t would be a mistake to leave 
judgments about the ‘proper’ distribution of speech to politicians. Arming them with a 
roving license to level the playing field by silencing or adjusting the volume of disfavored 
speakers is an invitation to self-serving behavior and, ultimately, tyranny.”). 
